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REFORMING DODD-FRANK: IS THE FINANCIAL
CHOICE ACT – OR ANY OTHER LEGISTLATION
PROPOSED – THE RIGHT CHOICE?
by
Roy J. Girasa
Jessica A. Magaldi**
Joseph DiBenedetto***
INTRODUCTION
A political storm has arisen with the election of
President Donald Trump in 2016. President Trump inherited a
Republican Senate and House of Representatives, somewhat
comparable to the election of the Democrat President, Barack
Obama, who initially had a Democrat legislative body eight
years before. The U.S. economy was radically different at each
commencement, with Obama facing the greatest financial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s while Trump
witnessed a mainly recovered and prosperous economy. When
President Trump took office, the unemployment rate had fallen
from approximately 10 percent to below five percent,
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bordering on what some economists would term “full
employment.” Nevertheless, the economic status of many
Americans remained stagnant as of 2016, causing an
unexpected surge of dissatisfied voters who opted to change
their political party-designation based upon the hope of the
fulfillment of the slogan “Make America Great Again,” the
assumption underlying the slogan being that the United States
no longer had the global economic and political power it once
possessed.
A major alleged cause for the claim that America is not
great was the proliferation of governmental regulation and
oversight that allegedly was responsible for less than desired
economic prosperity for middle- and lower-class American
workers. This Article will explore the pros and cons of federal
financial regulation – and efforts made to overturn a vast
segment of the regulations. We will examine key provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulatory provisions enacted
pursuant thereto that often cause consternation among the
affected financial participants.
DODD-FRANK ACT AND REGULATIONS
President Trump’s Executive Orders
President Donald Trump issued a series of executive
orders to limit government regulation of large segments of the
economy. One of his first executive orders was entitled,
“Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.”1
Historically, the claim by President Trump that excessive
regulation impeded economic growth was the not the first such
claim by a Republican President. President Ronald Reagan, in
office from 1981 to 1989, also attributed the financial crisis he
inherited upon taking office to over-regulation of industry;
therefore he issued Executive Order 12291 as one of his first
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actions as President.2 That order, which is similar in scope and
content to President Trump’s Executive Orders of January 30,
2017 stated that each agency shall consider and prepare an
analysis of the regulatory impact of every major rule.3
President Trump issued a further Executive Order4 requiring
the head of each executive agency to submit within 180 days a
proposed plan to reorganize the agency in order to improve its
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability.
Recommendations sought were the elimination of unnecessary
agencies, components thereof, agency programs, and the
merger of functions. The factors to be considered are:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)
(v)

whether some or all of the functions of an
agency, a component, or a program are
appropriate for the Federal Government or
would be better left to State or local
governments or to the private sector through
free enterprise;
whether some or all of the functions of an
agency, a component, or a program are
redundant, including with those of another
agency, component, or program;
whether certain administrative capabilities
necessary for operating an agency, a component,
or a program are redundant with those of
another agency, component, or program;
whether the costs of continuing to operate an
agency, a component, or a program are justified
by the public benefits it provides; and
the costs of shutting down or merging agencies,
components, or programs, including the costs of
addressing the equities of affected agency staff. 5
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Thus, the combined Presidential and Congressional actions
raise the issue of governmental regulatory actions as
roadblocks to economic expansion.
Purposes of Regulatory Oversight under the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act6 was passed in 2010 solely by the
unanimous vote of Democrat representatives in the House and
the required super-majority of Senators in the Senate. In the
face of total opposition of Republican legislators, the Act was
signed into law by President Barack Obama in order to curb
alleged significant abuses and lack of oversight by federal
agencies that led to the 2007 recession. The demise of Lehman
Brothers and the near demise of major financial institutions led
the federal government to institute a major bailout of troubled
banks and other entities to prevent the collapse of these
institutions both domestically and worldwide.
Factors That Led to Economic Collapse:
There were a number of causes that led to the critical
juncture of determining which responses were to be undertaken
by the federal government. Those opposed to government
bailouts believed that troubled institutions should be allowed to
liquidate in accordance with market theory under capitalism or
other economic theories7 while other commentators and
government officials such as U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson Jr. and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke believed
that the failure to rescue them through TARP program8 would
cause a massive financial breakdown comparable to or worse
than the Great Depression of the 1930s.9
The ostensible causes for the 2007 financial near
collapse are many and are often recited according to the
ideological preferences of the commentators. Nevertheless,
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there appears to be a consensus of the major factors that led to
it. The initial cause appears to be the grant and sale of
subprime mortgages, that is, mortgage loans grated to home
buyers who could ill afford to pay the monthly premiums
particularly when the premiums initially given at “teaser” rates
(rates that were very low but due to rise after one or more
years) or if the homeowner lost his or her job or became
incapacitated. Inasmuch as the cost of housing kept rising
almost daily, there appeared to be no risk because the homes
could be sold at a profit in the event the homeowner was
unable to make the monthly payment. These loans, often
consisting of the entire often highly inflated value of the home
and even the closing costs, were pooled, packaged into levels
of tranches depending on risk at increasing interest rates and
sold to investors, including pension and mutual funds and
foreign banks. Such investors heretofore believed the loans to
be nearly risk-free.
The pooled mortgages were used to back securities
called collateralized debt obligations. The major rating
agencies gave the instruments unjustified high ratings, either
due to lack of knowledge of the new forms of complex
financial securities or outright neglect, as they profited from
the fees from making the ratings in competition with each
other. When homeowners began having difficulties making the
premium payments, their properties were foreclosed upon.
These many thousands of foreclosures were partly responsible
for the ensuing death spiral of bank closures and job losses.10
As described by another scholar, the death spiral consisted of a
fall in the value of the inflated asset value that was backed by
high leverage which then led to margin calls compelling
investors to sell the asset which then lessened the value of the
asset; the fall in value lessened the collateral backing the initial
leveraged credit boom; which in turn forced a fire sale of the
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asset and the cascading resulting financial events vicious circle
of repeated events.11
There were other factors that contributed to the
mortgage crisis. Forbes attributed the crisis to the removal of
the separation of investment from commercial banks under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 2009 (the “2009 Act”) whereby
banks were now able to engage in high risk behavior but also
buttressed by the guaranteed deposits by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”); the Fed’s low interest prime
rates; the new forms of loans by poorly understood
mechanisms; credit agencies compliance; unregulated
derivatives and their uncontrolled explosion; nonbank
financial ventures; looser capital SEC requirements; lack of
governmental oversight; compensation tied to short-term
performance that led to high risk behavior; Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac underwriting of high risk loans; among other
factors.12
There were international macro-and micro-economic
causes for the financial downturn. Among them were the
decline in short-term interest rates brought about in part by
central banks, the opening of the Chinese economy, and the fall
of the Soviet Union that led to downward pressure on wages
and prices especially with the decline of labor unions; the
growing demand for mortgages; the increased market for
securitized bonds; and the rise of shadow banking were all
contributing factors in the global economy of which the U.S. is
the major player.13
Dodd-Frank Act Reform Efforts
The 2009 Act, consisting of 16 titles, covered the
largest segments of the U.S. economy and sought to remedy the
perceived fault lines that led to the 2007 crisis. The major
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concern was the promotion of the financial stability for the
domestic economy.14 It established the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”), whose membership is composed
of ten voting members and five non-voting members.
Members’ duties include identifying risks to the financial
stability of the U.S. that could arise from the material financial
distress or failure, promote market discipline, responding to
emerging threats to the U.S. financial system or activities of the
large interconnected banking and non-banking financial sectors
of the economy.15 FSOC is given the authority to supervise
nonbanks (engaged in shadow banking), which previously had
essentially been unregulated but now often became subsidiaries
of bank holding companies.16 FSOC was empowered to
investigate and determine which financial institutions when
facing possible collapse could lead to the overall harm to the
general economy and make them subject to enhanced and
somewhat prudential standards so as to prevent their demise or
lessen the negative impacts such as those that ensued in the
wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and American
International Group.17
Additional areas of regulation of the 2009 Act include
regulation of hedge fund advisers and others, insurance orderly
liquidation for systemic risk companies, additional securities
laws regulation, consumer protection by the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and mortgage loan
financing.18
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE THROUGH THE
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT19
In the House of Representatives, Jeb
Hensarling,20chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, introduced a bill, Financial Choice Act of 2017
(the “Choice Act”)21 which, in essence, would substantially

77 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

modify or repeal major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010.22 The bill was passed by the House of Representatives
by a vote of 233 to 186 with no Democrat Representative
voting for the bill. There is virtually no chance of passage in
the Senate due to the opposition of Democrat senators who
would filibuster such enactment and would require a supermajority vote of 60 of the 100 senators. The Republican
legislators could attempt to bypass the supermajority required
by passing a regulatory relief bill through reconciliation which
requires only 50 votes in the Senate.23 The bill raises, among
many other issues, whether the regulations created pursuant to
the Dodd-Frank Act are excessive and thereby impose too high
a regulatory burden upon financial institutions and an
impediment to the overall U.S. economy.
Former Senator Phil Gramm,24 former chairman of the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee and
co-author of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999,25 which
removed the separation of investment banks from commercial
banks, testified on May 10, 2017 that the principal cause of low
economic growth in the U.S. has been the result of the
regulatory burden placed upon the financial sector of the
economy.26 In essence, the argument made by Gramm and
others was that, although major financial institutions can afford
to retain compliance officers to supervise and assure regulatory
compliance, nevertheless, small entities, particularly
community banks and credit unions cannot afford to retain
such expertise. The net result allegedly is harm to the overall
economy causing it to have less than optimum annual gross
domestic product, which averaged 3.2 percent since 1947 and a
first-quarter 2017 growth rate of 1.2 percent.27
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Key Provisions of the Choice Act
Although the Choice Act, as of this writing has little
chance of passage in the U.S. Senate, nevertheless, it does
provide a comprehensive exposure of the Republican platform
that has sought to lessen what it perceives to be the regulatory
stranglehold on the domestic economy. It is anticipated that
the Senate will emulate most of the key provisions of the
Choice Act. Thus, we will review and discuss the key
provisions of the bill and the likelihood of passage by both
houses of Congress.
The 350-page proposed Choice Act (called by
democrats “The Wrong Choice Act”)28, is composed of 12
titles. It substantially alters the Dodd-Frank Act by repealing
the Volcker Rule, gutting the Orderly Liquidation Authority,
and repealing the Fiduciary Duty rule. It practically reduces the
protections of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
exempts banks from alleged onerous requirements provided
they hold 10 percent of capital assets. The first major change
is stated in Title I, Subtitle A, “Ending “Too Big to Fail” and
Bank Bailouts, Section 111, repeals the Orderly Liquidation
Authority.
Choice Act Title I: Ending “Too Big to Fail” and Bank
Bailouts
Repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority:
Although Title I of the Choice Act emphasizes the
termination of taxpayer assistance to troubled banks, it does so
by ending the Dodd-Frank Act mechanism for identifying those
financial institutions which, if they were to become financially
insolvent would cause substantial stress to the overall U.S. and
global economies as discussed above.29 Rather than identifying
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“systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”) by
FSOC under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and making them
subject to enhanced prudential standards,30 the Choice Act
substitutes a bankruptcy procedure for a “covered financial
corporation” defined as a bank holding company, which is
corporation whose primary purpose is to own, control, or
finance subsidiaries having a total consolidated assets of $50
billion or more, or such ownership or control of financial
assets relating to depositary institutions represents 85 percent
of the consolidated assets of the corporation.31
The proposed elimination of the orderly liquidation
authority (“OLA”) as an alternative to a Chapter 7 or Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code32 and its replacement of SIFI with
an exclusive bankruptcy procedure has engendered much
controversy. Most commentators appear to be opposed to the
elimination of the Dodd-Frank mechanism.33 One scholar,
while acknowledging that the OLA is not perfect, nevertheless,
recognizes it as an essential tool for government regulators to
ensure that the financial crisis attributable to a particular SIFI
does not escalate to a broader financial crisis. Substituting a
bankruptcy judge’s determination would be far less effective
than that of highly experienced financial regulators who have
extensive oversight over the U.S. economy.34 These regulators
are better able to deal with the complexities of the financial
system and its relationship with the global economy in place of
a bankruptcy judge lacking the overall experience of the
regulators.35 On the other hand, bankruptcy judges are more
concerned with protecting the rights of creditors rather than
determining what is best for the overall financial economy of
the U.S.36
Another scholar noted that there were three main
criticisms of the OLA: (1) that it creates a moral hazard by
allegedly encouraging investors to take more risks because it
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gives the government authority to resolve a failed entity,
making it more likely to step in if the entity is “too-big-to-fail”;
(2) the FDIC is given too much discretion under the OLA
because it does not require it to use the “single-point-ofentry”37 in the event of a crisis but may take options treating
creditors differently that they had anticipated; and (3) that the
use of bankruptcy procedures is better than the existing
mechanism. The response to the criticism is (a) the financial
firms, such as General Electric, that have been designated
SIFIs instituted structural changes to conform to will no longer
be subject to enhanced prudential standards; (b) the complaint
can be resolved without the need for ending the OLA; and (c)
the bankruptcy procedure is inadequate for large banks and
institutions during a financial crisis and may require financial
government intervention to prevent widespread disruption.
Also, under Dodd-Frank, failing firms are to use the
bankruptcy procedure and are required to have “living wills”
negating OLA’s involvement as a last resort.38
Constitutional objections have also been raised, namely,
under Section 202 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This section,
Judicial Review, provides for the commencement of orderly
liquidation via a petition to the federal district court when there
is a determination by the Treasury Secretary that a financial
company satisfies the requirements establishing that the
financial company is in default or in danger of default and that
such failure would have a serious adverse effect on the
financial stability of the U.S. and no other viable alternative is
available.39 If the board of directors of the financial company
objects to the petition then the corporation is to be appointed as
receiver.40 The determination is to be confidential without
public disclosure, and the court is to determine whether the
finding of the secretary is arbitrary and capricious.41 If the
court does not make a determination within 24 hours then the
Secretary is authorized to appoint the corporation as receiver
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and liquidation is to take place automatically and immediately
without further notice. Appeal is limited. There are criminal
penalties for persons who recklessly disclose the determination
of the Secretary of the petition and pendency of the
proceeding.42
There appears to be serious constitutional objections to
the secrecy of the proceedings; the criminal nature of any
disclosure (reason for the provision is to avoid panic in the
financial markets) that raises First Amendment freedom of
speech issues; the limited time element for a court to make a
determination; the mandatory nature of liquidation when other
alternatives may be more properly available which may raise
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause; the limited nature of judicial
review; and other related constitutional issues.43
President Trump appears to favor the elimination of the
OLA. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury, the
President directed the Secretary to review the authority of the
OLA within 180 days from April 21, 2017, consider the
potential adverse effects of failing financial on the financial
stability of the U.S.; whether invoking OLA could engender a
cost to the Treasury; whether OLA’s availability could lead to
excessive risk taking by creditors, counterparties, and
shareholders; whether a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code
would be a superior method of resolving the resolution of
failing companies; OLA’s anticipated direct and indirect
effects; and recommendation for improvement, if any, for
legislative changes.44
In another memorandum issued the same day, this one
concerning FSOC, the President directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to conduct a thorough review of FCO’s determination
and designation processes. He sought information on whether
the processes are sufficiently transparent; provide entities with
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adequate due process; give market participants the expectation
that the Federal Government will shield supervised or
designated entities from bankruptcy. He also sought an
evaluation of a nonbank financial company’s vulnerability to
material financial distress; whether any determination as to
whether a nonbank financial company’s material financial
distress could threaten the financial stability of the United
States; and whether these processes adequately consider the
costs of any determination or designation on the regulated
entity.45
Repeal of the Volcker Rule:
The Choice Act repeals The Volcker Rule, the name of
which refers to the former Federal Reserve Chair. Paul
Volcker, Federal Reserve Board Chair under both Presidents
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, and Ronald Reagan, a Republican,
instituted the Rule while acting as Chairman of the Economic
Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama.
The financial crisis of 2007 and the events that brought about
the closing of numerous banks for the first time since the Great
Depression of the 1930s, led to an examination of the causes of
the 2007 Recession. Historically, there were bank panics
approximately every two decades since the founding of the
nation but none for five decades after the Glass-Steagall Act of
193346 separation of investment from commercial banks
instituted under President Franklin Roosevelt.
The separation ended with the passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act of 1999 which permitted banks to engage in
security offerings and insurance services.47 A major factor for
bank closings allegedly was the removal of the said separation.
Although the current President, Donald Trump, stated that he
wants to break up the large banking entities effectively by
reviving the prior separation of banking entities,48 it is unclear
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whether the president will follow through inasmuch as his
Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, and his economic
adviser, Gary Cohn, stated that a “21st Century” version of the
Glass Steagall Act will be endorsed, with its meaning being
unclear.49
Pursuant to Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, a new
Section 13 was added to the Bank Holding Act. The “Volcker
Rule” prohibits an insured depositary institution and holding
company controlling an insured depositary institution from
engaging in proprietary trading or from acquiring or retaining
an ownership interest, sponsoring, or having certain
relationships with hedge funds or private equity funds.
“Proprietary trading” was given a broad definition that
includes: acting as a principal or custodian for an affiliated
party; for a trading account used by the entity to acquire or be
financially involved in short-term resale; the prohibition of
purchasing, selling, or otherwise acquiring or dispensing of
stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments for the bank’s own
account. It covers both banking entities and nonbank (shadow
banking) institutions. Title VI of the Choice Act50 repeals
Section 619 (the Volcker Rule) and related provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
The repeal the Volcker Rule has generated more
controversy than may have been anticipated. Those scholars
favoring the Rule describe the proposed repeal in terms such as
“amnesia” by the negligent or deliberate lack of memory
concerning the financial crisis that caused the Rule to be
enacted. In order to prevent banks from being “too-big-to-fail
and making use of the Federal Reserve Bank’s discount
window, banks should not be permitted to gamble with
taxpayer funds.51 Arguments for the repeal as stated before a
House Capital Markets, Securities and Investment
Subcommittee in March of 2017 include the alleged inability of
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American businesses to obtain affordable financing for longterm growth; their significant increased borrowing costs; lower
investment returns for households; harmful effects on corporate
bond liquidity causing dealers to be more restrictive in
providing liquidity during times of stress; additional
restrictions on market making an underwriting activities, all of
which serve to impact businesses and restrict their ability to
finance short-term needs and plan for long-term growth.52
SIFI Designation Repeal:
The newly created Financial Stability Oversight
Council (“FSOC”), pursuant to Section 111 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, was given the power to designate banks and nonbanks for
supervision by the Financial Stability Board. There are
exceptions for trading in U.S. government securities,
underwriting and market-related activities, trading on behalf of
customers. FSOC’s designation of a financial institution as a
“systemically important financial institution” – or SIFI – would
bring about a panoply of heightened prudential standards that
are onerous to the designated firm.
The designation as a SIFI has been extremely
controversial. Thus, when General Electric Capital
Corporation received the designation, it sold off billions of
dollars of assets to remove the said designation. MetLife’s
designation on December 18, 2014 was particularly contentious
because it is essentially an insurance company with allegedly
far less risk investments than the banking sector. It
commenced litigation to invalidate the designation and to date
has been successful at the District Court level.53 It is pending
appeal but there are indications that the current administration
may rescind its appeal of the decision.54
Impact on Community Banks
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A major concern underlying the Choice Act is the
impact of federal regulation on smaller financial institutions
which lack the resources to comply with onerous regulations.
The Economist publication illustrates the difficulty by
reference to the merger of Standard Financial, a bank with
some $488 million and nine branches, with Allegheny Valley
Bancorp a smaller neighboring bank in a Pittsburgh suburb.
The main reason for the merger, quoting the CEO of Standard,
was the cost of regulatory compliance that would not have
occurred but for the cost. Larger banks inherently are more
able to afford personnel assuring regulatory compliance while
smaller entities operating on a smaller profit margin can ill
afford the additional regulatory cost structure. Alleged proof
of the effect of regulations is the number of community banks
that have failed – over 400 – with only five new banks in
existence, which provide 43 percent of small business loans
nationally. The cost of compliance is illustrated by the
additional personnel required to service mortgages, which is at
the heart of community bank lending.55 The Independent
Community Bankers of America, an organization representing
some 5,800 community banks is supportive of the Choice Act
provisions reforming and lessening mortgage lending
requirements.56
It appears that relief for community banks is bipartisan
but Democrats object to the overall dismantling of the DoddFrank Act and would support a separate bill for community
bank regulatory relief.57 There appears to be mixed reactions to
the bill from the banking sector. The American Bankers
Association (“ABA”) President and CEO, Rob Nichols,
signified the ABA’s support of the bill, which he described as
providing “much-needed regulatory relief.”58 The publication
American Banker, on the other hand, decries the claim of the
chair of the committee that community banks are in a crisis due
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to the Dodd-Frank Act. It alleges that the claim is divorced
from reality in two respects, namely, that the main
beneficiaries of the legislation are the megabanks, not the vast
majority of community banks and that the challenges that
community banks have been subjected to predate and were
unrelated to the post 2007 financial crisis. It cited the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, which illustrated that the top
four banks accounted for 89 percent of all notional derivatives
and 96 percent of credit derivatives. It noted that the 2009 Act
as stated above undermines the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, nullifies key shareholder rights of all but the largest
shareholders, eliminates the orderly liquidation authority of the
FDIC, and nullifies the Volcker Rule that reinstitute the risks
posed by the pre-2007 crisis59.
The author further noted that the Dodd-Frank Act
imposed few restrictions on community banks, which, except
for six community banks of 5,000, were not subject to stress
tests that were applicable only to banks with over $10 billion in
consolidated assets and heightened requirements applicable to
banks with over $50 billion in consolidated assets. The DoddFrank Act’s exemption of banks from most of the regulatory
requirements having a 10 percent capital ratio is likely not
sufficient to avert a further crisis should a 2007 scenario arise
new. A safer capital ratio for regulatory exemptions should be
in the range of 20 to 30 percent.60 Other observers, however,
while acknowledging the resiliency of community banks in
attempting to comply with regulatory requirements,
nevertheless note they have been seriously harmed in their
attempt to grow and serve customers in their community. With
an average of 42 employees for medium-size banks, they do
not have the capacity to understand, train and test for
compliance, and apply the multiplicity of rules and regulations
required of them.61

87 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

In an extensive study by the Congressional Research
Service,62 it determined that, although the regulatory burden for
small banks has increased in absolute terms, but not so in
comparison with larger banks due to accommodations in recent
rules and regulations since the financial crisis. It is
exemplified by the fact that 13 of 14 “major rules” of baking
regulators include either exemptions for small banks or the
regulations are tailored to reduce the cost from small banks.
The one exception provides regulatory relief for securities
backed by capital frequently issued by small banks. None of
these regulations are likely to negatively affect the ability of
small banks to compete with large banks although there may be
some effect in competitive dealings with nonbanks. It further
concluded that overestimating the regulatory burden on small
banks may lead to policy changes that may have negative
consequences for consumers, banks, and the broader economy.
Underestimating the regulatory burden could result in further
consolidation of banks which, in turn, may lead to shifting of
assets from banks to the shadow banking system.63
ECONOMIC GROWTH, REGULATORY RELIEF, AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The Choice Act, which was not adopted by the
Congress, was followed by the Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act64 which was passed by
the Senate but not yet adopted by the House. The Act is
composed of seven titles, which include the establishments of
lower regulatory requirements and oversight from the FSOC
for banks between $50 billion and $250 billion in assets; the
exemption from the Volcker Rule that bans banks from
engaging in speculative trades for banks with less than $10
billion in assets and their total trading assets and trading
liabilities that do not exceed more than five percent of total
consolidated assets; the requirement that the Federal Reserve
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not regulate banks in a “one size fits all” thus removing major
roadblocks from community banks in their lending policies;
and the allowance of foreign banks to avoid U.S. regulatory
scrutiny by tallying their U.S. assets in a manner to keep them
under the $250 billion threshold.65
The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act differs from the Choice Act in that its
limits the scope of the Volcker Rule rather than provide for its
total repeal. Unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, which faced near
total Republican opposition and total Democrat Senate support,
the Crapo bill (named for its sponsor Sen. Mike Crapo
(Republican of Idaho), did have some Democrat support by its
easing of restrictions on more local community banks.
Individuals applying for mortgages in the post-Dodd-Frank era
experienced significant roadblocks which often dissuaded
otherwise eligible applicants from purchasing homes.
Community banks, which relied on the issuance of mortgages
for home purchases as a mainstream of their profitability found
themselves unable to make loans in many cases due to the
inordinate governmental regulatory restrictions. Community
banks would have fared better under the Choice Act that has an
“off-ramp” feature that allowed a qualifying banking
organization of any size to elect to be exempt from riskweighted capital requirements and other restrictions but the
Crapo bill lessened oversight for banks with under $10 billion
in total assets as stated above.66
PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Environmental Regulatory Changes
Although a Republican President, Richard Nixon, was
responsible for much of the major legislation to protect the
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environment, the Trump administration has made a concerted
effort to remove alleged barriers to employment due to
regulations pursuant to federal statutory obligations. National
Geographic, in a lengthy presentation, recited a summary of
decisions and actions that directed contradict decades of
protection.67 Among the changes is the Environmental
Protection Agency’s proposed rule that the Agency to only
consider scientific studies for which the underlying data is
made available publicly, The problem, according to at least
1,000 scientists who oppose the rule change, is that much of
the underlying data is based on personal health information
which cannot be made publicly available due to privacy
concerns. The Department of the Interior submitted a rule
change that removes protection for threatened wildlife species.
Other changes affecting the environment is the rollback of car
emissions standards; the reorganization of an EPA group that
funds research on children’s health and environmental health
disparities; FEMA expelling of “climate change” from its
strategic plan; cuts to clean-energy programs; loosening of
regulations on toxic air pollution; removal of the U.S. from the
Paris Accord (the only country in the world to do so); the
proposal to scrap clean power plan; the halting of mining
health studies; and numerous other anti-environmental
programs.68
Consumer Protection Changes
The Dodd-Frank Act created in Title X, the Consumer
Financial Protection Act, which established the consumer
Financial Protection Bureau as an independent agency within
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
Bureau has been aggressive in combatting anti-consumer
actions by credit card companies, pay-day loans that seriously
jeopardize by grossly inflated interest charges loans made to

2019 / Reforming Dodd-Frank / 90

low income employees who require immediate moneys for
payment of necessary daily living expenses.
President Trump’s appointment of Director Mick
Mulvaney signaled the end of its mission to protect consumers.
The Bureau, albeit not ended, nevertheless has taken no
punitive measures against any alleged wrongdoers and has not
sought any funding for the investigation and prosecution of
actions against consumers. It has essentially ended its
investigation of Equifax with respect to a massive data breach;
ended investigations of discriminatory lending practices against
minorities, and let go a myriad of other alleged offenses against
consumers.69
PROS AND CONS OF REGULATION
As with almost any statutory and regulatory enactment,
there are winners and losers, but the goal of governmental
action is to provide for the betterment of the common good –
particularly when there are societal difficulties that need to be
addressed. The problem arises that the philosophical
differences make compromise exceedingly difficult particularly
when the media reflects the nation’s deep divide and its
audience listens only to the viewpoint desired by it. Thus,
while congressional representatives may individually desire to
compromise their views for the benefit of their constituencies,
the fear of retribution from extremist elements within their
particular parties supported by extreme media outlets cause
them to maintain uncompromising extreme views. The
question posed in this Article is whether the regulatory regime
created under different political administrations warrants
significant downsizing or reform to accomplish the statutory
goals of protection for the common good. There are major
arguments that have some merit for either viewpoint.
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Arguments in Favor of Regulation
The crisis of 2007 reflected major problems in the
financial system that led to systemic risks that ultimately
almost caused the collapse of the U.S. and global economies.
With a decade to reflect on the events leading up to the crisis it
becomes clearer to economists and policy makers what
occurred and the options available to both end the economic
downturn and attempt to prevent at least near future financial
catastrophes. Among the arguments favoring government
regulation is that it assists in keeping the markets competitive
especially by prosecuting anti-monopolistic behavior; gives
voice to consumers who often are ignored in the manipulations
accompanying market activities such as drugs, stocks, and
other commodity pricing; and compels greater transparency
and freedom in the marketplace.70
The Geneva Report on Financial Regulation affirms in
great part the regulatory environment such as that promulgated
under Dodd-Frank.71 Reflecting in large measure the financial
bubble that burst in 2007 and immediately thereafter, it
recommends both macro- and micro-prudential approaches for
governmental regulation. It further recommends greater
intervention in global markets to encourage competition and
prevent oligopolistic behavior. Macro-prudential regulation
should be countercyclical to negate the effect of bubbles whose
bursting can lead to global distress. Regulators should agree
on those sectors of the economy of systemic institutions that
could cause disruptions and seek global solutions and
cooperation.72
Arguments Alleging Excessive Regulation Impede Economic
Growth
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The essence of the claim that excessive regulation
impedes growth was succinctly stated in Forbes Magazine. It
recited that middle-class households received 15 percent less
credit while wealthy households received increased credit of 21
percent; the nation’s five largest banks control 44 percent of all
U.S. banking assets; the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in 24,000
pages of regulations although one-quarter more of the required
some 400 regulations are yet to be finalized; that the Volcker
Rule which made the corporate bond market less liquid was
created although evidenced lacked that proprietary trading
contributed to the financial crisis; and that FSOC’s
extraordinary power to designate nonbanks SIFIs wrongfully
designated insurance companies (Prudential and MetLife) as
SIFIs causing them to be subject to prudential enhancement
even though they did not contribute to the crisis.73
Did Bank Regulations Impede Financial Stability?
It appears that the large banks required to undergo
stress testing under the Dodd-Frank Act have not suffered from
the Act’s requirements. On June 28, 2017, it was reported that
all of the 34 largest U.S. banks required to undergo such testing
had passed it thereby permitted to return 100 percent of profits
at their option to investors in place of 65 percent last year.
Even previously troubled banks, such as Citibank, Wells Fargo
(which had undergone extraordinary scandal of creating
fraudulent accounts),74 and the American units of Santander
Holdings USA and Deutsche Bank have met regulatory
standards.75 Nevertheless, although the largest banks have
managed to recover from their major downturn and near
demise of a decade ago, the question remains whether
nonbanks (shadow banks) and community banks have also
shared in the financial upturn.
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CONCLUSION
The above discussion reflects the philosophical
differences of the two major political parties. Although the
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted without any Republican legislator
voting for the Act to address the financial crisis of a decade
ago, the question arose whether the enormous scope of the
enactment was excessive. Republican legislators have
historically been opposed to government intrusion, particularly
in the financial sector, in the belief that the market should bear
the positive and negative consequences of actions taken by all
sectors of the economy. The Choice Act does reflect the
philosophical views of the President, his key advisers, and the
Republican Party.76
There are valid arguments both for and against
significant changes in the Dodd-Frank all-encompassing
regulatory system that Democrats also agree warrant revisiting.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Choice Act and subsequent
proposed legislation appear to ignore the origin and purposes
for the 2010 Act. In any event, the discussion may be moot
inasmuch as the Trump Administration may simply refuse to
enforce the Dodd-Frank mandates and regulatory scheme.
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, has indicated that he will
simply not convene FSOC over which the Treasury
Department jurisdiction. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the
Treasury Secretary to consent to decisions made by the
Council. The MetLife litigation whereby MetLife opposed its
SIFI designation is on appeal and it appears that the
Administration will not pursue the appeal and allow MetLife to
prevail. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the changes made
legally and politically will bring about another crisis or, as the
President alleges, the U.S. will be great again.
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